Shakne, CBS, 25 Oct 87

"McN wondered if he'd see another Sunday morning"
(Saturday night).

(He was recommending recon — ~~to~~ and saying to public that SAM had been shot down — to have an excuse to *hit SAMs* on Sunday

Hyp: Killing Russians would have changed Russian "values" — away from caution.

If JFK had *not* been led — by RFK! who wrote the statement! — on Sept 4 of making a public statement, *just before an election* ... no "crisis."

If Pres had decided on his own, with a few advisors, or

If Pres had not *ruled out* "acceptance" of SSMs on *16* Oct [*Did* he have a good night on Monday, the 15th? What if he *had* had a *night* to think it over before first meeting?]

and ruled out "negotiations (only)":

- *First move* had to be strong
- Missiles had to go" [Had to be defined as 'serious threat' to public; "*offensive* sites discovered" had to *endorse* most fearful, most aggressive

then by, say, Oct 18-19, ExCom/Pres would have moved *back* to negot/acceptance

It was a very nervous period — Burlatsky

so passive that it permitted SU to erode our security and the confidence of our allies

MCN Mil. action initiated by US on Cuba ~~[illegible]~~ escalate.

McN

... not because I could predict the road to disaster, but because I couldn't predict a road that wouldn't lead to disaster.

Blockade game

bet 1/3 and 1/2 that we would go to war.

said "Oct 21st" (meant Oct 27)

Sor — some SU acting on his own (vs. SAM

Cordel Rowe CO

Bur: There was a very strong order from K not to provocate, to be silent...

Cuban general: del Pino
K

a Soviet general at CP? gave order to shoot down

Hardline types who were against K's orders to dismantle missiles...

McN: increase pressure on Monday...

[go ~~back~~ ?]

events spinning rapidly out of control

"no much

McN's

It is impossible to predict with a

high

Crisis management is impossible

Avoid crises

Mikoyan (first came since K — who said Cubans...)

"Cubans are the Russian problem —
but K had not solved that problem
out ~~that~~ — he did not

"We were right to guarantee, but...
McG B: The real hero was K, for backing down...

K did not direct and did not intend the shooting down of the U-2 — nor

quote

By the night of 27th, K received from RFK — along with a 48-hour ultimatum — a

Beyond that, he knew that Cuban artillery was not under his controls

23 Oct 87

The putting missiles in Cuba is a clear-cut example of the "cost" & risk ~~[illegible]~~ of a threat —

it was designed to "put pressure" on the Cubans — leading not to concessions but to overthrow...

It was on purpose not to reassure the Cubans & Sovs of our intent — say, if WH had known that Sovs and Cubans did believe, "wrongly" in an invasion...

Therefore, we got missiles in Cuba — as a counter-threat — and high risks of war

along with

[Why avoid public trade?

a) Because SU missiles were inadmissible — "they were the burglars" — so we couldn't trade

b) We couldn't trade "under the gun"; under threat...

- of what?
  - of guns in Cuba? (= guns in Turkey)
  - of refusal to get out? (without a trade: even under US violent threat.
  - threat to retaliate — perhaps elsewhere —
  - of claim that our rights were equivalent.

Kennedy won the crisis not because he ~~being tough~~ was uncompromising or because he had superior forces although he had superior force he was quite properly ready to compromise rather than go to war. He won because ~~Khrushchev~~ conceded unexpectedly fast to terms Kennedy did not expect him to accept before Kennedy was ~~[illegible]~~ moved to lower his terms.

Khrushchev moved that fast because unknown to Kennedy, K had lost control of Cuban & perhaps Soviet forces

From K's perspective, on the early morning of October 28th, J. K estimate of the risk of war between 1/3 & 1/2, was not ~~exaggerated~~, too high, though that was so for reasons Kennedy did know. ~~& He [illegible] have not lasted to this day~~ Unless he started moving his missiles out immediately, these odds hung on the accuracy of Cuban gunners & boldness of American pilots.

K~~[illegible]~~ chose to opt out of the game of Cuban Roulette, without waiting for one more day's spin of the chamber. In this, despite Chinese & Albanian charges of cow ~~[illegible]~~ & weakness, despite the political costs to himself, ~~he was right~~ despite the fact that he lost the contest where he might have won, he made the right decision.

Explaining his decision, he said the ~~smell~~ of - - - -

~~That~~ warning scent drifts on

~~Had included~~

~~That the night before R Kennedy had given 48 hours ultimatum~~

~~Even those who knew of 48 ultimatum~~
~~That missiles would be hit if not withdrawn~~
~~Kennedy was prepared to accept these terms~~
~~They could not be known to K, but~~
could well of been guessed - Preside

No one guessed why he acted so precipitately

Neither did Berlatsky who helped him draft etc.

He described the mood of urgency
He never knew what was the result.

In fact ~~there was~~ K had good reason
In the course of a highly classified study, RK revealed to me in 1964 something known only a handful of officials at the time - that he had accompanied with
Berlatsky

K knew something Kennedy did not know. He could not prevent...

~~As a man~~

~~This was a hypothesis possibility~~

This independence by Castro was not even imagined by any of the advisors, caught as they were in a cold war stereotype of Soviet control over a satellite

Castro Tad Szulc

2 Oct 87

Deterrence

Bishops say: to initiate nuclear war is a crime against
God and humanity...

~~[illegible]~~ Our policy is based on the threat to do this —
and we prepare ... in ways that can lead to doing
it, do not doing it...

The threat, the risk, is not the same as the act
(nor, for anyone but Cath bishops, is it
"just as bad"... even, the conditional intention...
let alone, a "bluff"

Nor is it certain to result in nuc war...

And it can, in certain ways, lower the probability
that nuc war will be started by anyone [AS WELL AS THE PROB OF ENSLAVEMENT]*
otherwise likely and imminent
both by direct deterrence of acts likely to lead to nuc initiation
or
— ~~and by deterring deterring~~ (even without prior intent
or threat or prep)
— and, in some ways, by
shaping the environment and attitudes ~~[illegible]~~ in ways that
reduce the prob. of certain paths to nuclear war
— and other evils: "enslavement"
(which itself may be a path to
war/revolt and nuc war)

BUT THESE PREPS, THREATS, MIND-SETS, ALSO WORK TO HAVE
THE OPPOSITE EFFECTS. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A SOBER APPRAISAL
OF ALL THE EFFECTS — INCLUDING ALTERNATIVES FORECLOSED OR FOREGONE —
AND A WEIGHING OF OVERALL CONSEQUENCES AGAINST ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

* though it has been used to maintain a status quo
including forms of non-Com enslavement

1 Oct 87

[absence of what kinds of war? Result?
Supported by will?
Americans, attack
on homeland?

— "If you want peace
prepare for war" { What kind of war?
against whom?
Is this prep likely to provoke
an arms race?
In offensive / aggressive / preemptive
weapons?

Prepare to: which result? (Romans)

to: punish
counter-attack
escalate
"pacify" / occupy / govern?
acceptable result
preempt / disarm

At what cost?
To society (As "prep" or benefit: to cycle
to R+D
to MIC

"Forest Fire Management"

[illegible]risis (Generation
and) Management"
(Winning at Reasonable Cost/Risk)

BRINKSMANSHI[illegible]
[illegible]ts of Esc.

Does war prep
— require / dispose one to perceive / define others as "enemies"
i.e. stimulate fear + hatred in ourself, crisis prop?
— interfere with other needs, props, rights?
(perhaps necessary to "peace," or its enjoyment).
— interfere with other peacemaking activities: negots, trade?
— cause fear in others (Athens, Thucy)
and counter-prep, reduce stability
(tend to "loss of control")
(loss of, e.g. "ability to avoid
going to war, starting war:
to avoid circumstances that lead to
war, capital war...)

CRISES Generated in 50's
early '60's by New Look:
reliance on threats, F.A.
(first, recent)

Was CII a "crisis" for
Sovs, before US blockade?
(Were they "desperate"?
Did they anticipate poss. of
fast, violent response of US?

[illegible]ians
[illegible]ies
(not, early of
Chinese;
Khe Sanh;
Pearl Harbor
WWII
German "mob"
in WWI

(WG) Crises: Sarajevo...
Berg
CII
Skybolt →
U-2
Quemoy
DBP
Korea
Tonkin Gulf
(crisis ambiguity)

— commit or dispose one
to perceive, or respond to
certain events (undeterminable, with certainty)
as "crises," causus belli, "threats"
or requiring one to threaten, or punish
maintain image / authority

__Det__ type I, II, III... __Model__ I, II, III... (cf., say,
Type I D

SDI I, II, III...

("Model" must be specified for both/all sides in a confrontation. Thus, often Mod I is used for foreigners, III or IV for US)

Type I, Model II...

Type II, Model IV...

Ideol. I, II, III

__Stability__ I, II,

Stability (based on, of) Conditional Instability

Control (of Opponent) by Threat of Losing Control

As Blight says, JFK may have been tempted/impelled __desperately__, to make __Threat__ of Losing Control /ult. because of 1) __fear__ of losing control, if K were not __deterred__ from (a) firing on U-2s recon
(b) __continuing__ to make missiles __operational__ ("must __stop__"; announcement Oct 2
~~but~~ or (c) hitting Turkish missiles (or Berlin) even if US hit Cuban missiles after (a) or (b) occurred

__Did__ RFK really say missiles must be __out__ starting in 24 hrs, or must stop __work__ on them?!
(K __got__ out because of threat to __recon__!)

(Hyp: This was a goal of offering private trade! "No need to hit Turkish missiles." But this might have made strike on Turk missiles look __safer__ to SU! As would __de-fusing__ them! (Was JFK __insisting__ retal on Turkish missiles rather than Berlin?)

Alternatives: Trade, humiliation, alliance below, LOSS OF ELECTIC

– Kaysen

– Rathjens

– IPS – Barnet, Borosage,

– Sanders

Aronson

Fisher –

Kelbofer seminars

* Many factors of risk can admittedly not be deterred; most unaffected by policies of "deterrence"; and many are enhanced by " " "; or thru probable nuclearization, escalation. Are they less important than wh is deterred? Does policy + paradigm of det. reduce risk, on balance?! Define a "whole" risk-reduction program, including TW, t

Who are Jackson's defense advisors?

Program? New paradigm?

Proposals to constrain Pres?!

"crisis" – avoidance rejection (not, "management" "exploitation")